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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
H. Alston Johnson HiP
As is usually the case, the 1977-78 term encompassed a
number of appellate decisions in the field of workmen's com-
pensation appropriate for brief comment without extended dis-
cussion, and a few which require more detailed commentary.
It was held during this term that a person called for service as
a juror and injured during that service was not entitled to com-
pensation from the parish,' thus treating jurors receiving mod-
est compensation for their service in a fashion similar to others
receiving modest compensation but not actually employees,
such as prison inmates.'
When a contract of employment is found, however, the
reach of coverage remains fairly pervasive. A construction em-
ployee injured while assisting a damsel in distress was held
entitled to compensation, either on the basis that the assis-
tance was incidental to employment or that, if a deviation, the
deviation had ended and he was returning to his employment'
An independent contractor engaged under an oral contract to
replace two light bulbs over a tennis court and injured while
doing so was also held entitled to compensation.'
A question of the proper allocation of compensation be-
tween two insurers was resolved by a case in which the injured
person was an undercover agent engaged to detect employee
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Jeansonne v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 354 So. 2d 619 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 356 So. 2d 436 (La. 1978) (no contract of employment; statute
requires that the parish and the juror "perform as they do").
2. Parker v. State, 353 So. 2d 333 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 354 So.
2d 1375 (La. 1978).
3. Quinney v. Maryland Cas. Co., 347 So. 2d 921 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977) (plain-
tiff at work on construction project in shopping center; motorist stuck in hole in
parking lot; plaintiff injured while helping extricate her car, or upon returning from
that endeavor).
4. Alexander v. Reed, 350 So. 2d 179 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 350 So.
2d 1206 (La. 1977) (unclear as to what other responsibilities plaintiff may have had,
but he was engaged to install the two light bulbs at five dollars apiece, and compensa-
tion was calculated upon that wage rate).
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theft.5 Since he was paid by the detective agency which origi-
nally employed him and the employer for whom he worked on
an assembly line to detect such theft, the compensation was
allocated between the two according to the percentage of his
wage borne by each.
Henderson v. Travelers Insurance Co. I is a matter of con-
siderably greater importance, but requires only brief comment
because it is the subject of a student note in this Review.' The
Henderson decision accomplishes a result long expected in the
compensation field: awarding of benefits upon the death of the
employee to a concubine. In a number of cases in recent years,
death benefits under the Act have been accorded to illegitimate
children of the deceased,' the "in-laws" of the deceased,' and
even the nephew of the deceased's concubine ' as "other depen-
dent members of the family,"" so long as they were in fact
dependent upon the deceased and formed a part of his
"household." The sole exclusion from this category was the
concubine herself.
The factual situation in Henderson made the extension
relatively easy. The court noted that the deceased died with no
surviving wife, child or other dependent, and thus there was no
question of infringement upon the rights of other claimants.
Moreover, the claimant had lived for eleven years in what was
described as a "stable, loving relationship" with the deceased.
Under the circumstances, the court thought that Humphreys
v. Marquette Casualty Co." ought to be overruled and the
concubine permitted to recover benefits.
The decision leaves some unanswered questions, discussed
more thoroughly in the student note. Despite the discussion in
terms of a concubine, the decision certainly must apply to male
as well as female claimants. But what sort of relationship will
5. Continental Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 350 So. 2d 183 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1977).
6. 354 So. 2d 1031 (La. 1978).
7. Note, 39 LA. L. REv. 269 (1978).
8. Caddo Contracting Co. v. Johnson, 222 La. 796, 64 So. 2d 177 (1953).
9. Archibald v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 202 La. 89, 11 So. 2d 492 (1942).
10. Patin v. T. L. James & Co., 218 La. 949, 51 So. 2d 586 (1951).
11. LA. R.S. 23:1232(8) (1950).
12. 235 La. 355, 103 So. 2d 895 (1958).
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qualify the claimant as a "Henderson concubine or para-
mour"? And what evidence will be necessary to establish that
relationship, recognizing that the person with the best evidence
is also in a self-serving position in coming forward with it?
What will be the outcome when the concubine or paramour is
claiming benefits which will infringe upon those to be ac-
corded, for example, to a legal spouse? 3 If we conclude that we
cannot discriminate between a legal spouse and an "illegal"
one as to workmen's compensation benefits, must we reach the
same conclusion, for example, as to a wrongful death claim?"
The present Act is simply not written in terms which
would countenance the resolution of these and other questions.
The proper solution is legislative action, rather than the vaga-
ries of the judicial process, which is not suited to accomplishing
whatever changes may be desirable on a case-by-case basis.
THE NEW DisABmrrY PROVISIONS
Undoubtedly the most discussed portion of the major
amendments to the Act in 1975 is the revision of the disability
provisions. A considerable amount of energy has been exerted
on speculating how the courts will react to the new definition
of disability, and whether the literal reading of the section will
be respected or rather will be enlarged by judicial interpreta-
13. See LA. R.S. 23:1232(1), (2), and (3) (1950) for example, which accord a
certain percentage of the deceased's wages as benefits to "the widow or widower" alone
or in conjunction with children. If there is a widow, for example, and a "Henderson
concubine," what disposition is to be made of the benefits? The real question is, shall
the concubine be treated as a surviving spouse? And if not, on what basis shall the
discrimination between the two be made?
14. We have previously encountered difficulties in a similar series of decisions.
In Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), it was held that Louisiana could not deny to
an illegitimate child of a deceased the right to sue for wrongful death when it would
grant the same right to a legitimate child. Thereafter, in Weber v. Aetna Cas. and Sur.
Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), it was held that Louisiana could not relegate illegitimates
asserting a right to workmen's compensation benefits to the "other dependent mem-
bers of the family" category, thus preferring legitimate children, perhaps to the ex-
haustion of benefits. If it should be held that the widow is to be preferred to the
concubine in the same manner, and if that ruling should not survive constitutional
attack, it is not improbable that the way would be open for a claim that Louisiana's
wrongful death provisions must not discriminate between the legal spouse and the
"illegal" spouse.
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tion. Early returns are now available on the question, 5 and the
results thus far are interesting and deserve extended comment.
The story of the interpretation of the former disability
provisions is well-known and needs only a summary here. The
former provisions dealt with three different types of disability:
(1) total disability, whether temporary or permanent, "to do
work of any reasonable character"; (2) partial disability "to do
work of any reasonable character"; and (3) a specific schedule
of compensation for injuries not producing disability falling
under the other two categories." Judicial interpretation of this
section, for reasons excellently enunciated by Professor Emeri-
tus Wex Malone elsewhere," was such that total disability
would be found if the claimant could not return to the same
employment in which he was engaged at the time of injury, or
could return to it but only to work in substantial pain. The
literal requirement that the injured employee be in a position
such that he could not work at all, in any reasonable employ-
ment, before he could be classified as totally disabled, was
simply not followed.
The only apparent concession offered to employers in the
197.5 amendments to the Act was the restructuring of the disa-
bility section so as to reflect a different rationale and probably
to strengthen somewhat the requirements necessary to find a
claimant totally disabled. As to total disability, it was provided
that only a claimant unable to "engage in any gainful occupa-
tion for wages" would be considered totally disabled. If the
claimant can engage in any gainful occupation for wages,
"whether or not the same or a similar occupation as that in
which the employee was customarily engaged when injured and
15. Some of the decisions interpreting the new provisions at the time of this
writing are: Wright v. Liberty Mut. Inc. Co., 357 So. 2d 1213 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 360 So. 2d 1180 (La. 1978) (working in pain); Rachal v. Highlands Ins. Co.,
355 So. 2d 1355 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 So. 2d 645 (La. 1978) (working in
pain); Kilbourne v. Armstrong, 351 So. 2d 802 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977); Phillips v.
Dresser Eng'r Co., 351 So. 2d 304 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 1048
(La. 1978) (working in pain); LeBlanc v. Commercial Union, 349 So. 2d 1283 (La. App.
1st Cir.), cert. denied, 351 So. 2d 174 (La. 1977).
16. LA. R.S. 23:1221 (Supp. 1968) (as it read prior to amendment by 1975 La.
Acts, No. 583).
17. Malone, Total Disability Evaluation Under the Louisiana Compensation
Act, 20 LA. L. REv. 486 (1960).
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whether or not an occupation for which the employee, at the
time of injury, was particularly fitted by reason of education,
training, and experience," he does not fit the statutory defini-
tion of a totally disabled employee.' 8
The category of partial disability was amended to reflect
an entirely new standard: if the injury prevents the employee
from performing the same duties he was customarily engaged
in at the time of injury, or duties of a similar character for
which he is suited by education, training, and experience, then
he is partially disabled and entitled to weekly benefits, but
subject to a maximum of 450 weeks.'" Moreover, the measure
of compensation is the difference between what the employee
was making at the time of injury and any amount which he
"actually earns" in any week thereafter in any gainful occupa-
tion for wages. 0
The intent of the new partial disability section must have
been to include those kinds of cases which had been treated as
total disability under interpretations of the previous Act. For-
merly, if the claimant could not return to the same or similar
work, he was entitled to an award of total disability. Now, if
he cannot return to such work, he is entitled only to an award
of partial disability, and then only for a maximum number of
weeks and only to the extent that he "actually earns" less than
he was earning at the time of his injury.
But whatever may be the intent of the new partial disabil-
ity section, this does not necessarily give us guidance on the
new total disability section, which contains a concept new to
the Louisiana Act: inability to engage in any gainful occupa-
tion for wages. What shall this mean?
The more cynical among us may simply feel that the
18. LA. R.S. 23:1221(1), (2) (Supp. 1968), as amended by 1975 La. Acts, No. 583.
19. LA. R.S. 23:1221(3) (Supp. 1968), as amended by 1975 La. Acts, No. 583.
20. It has been noted that a phrase such as "any lesser wages which the injured
employee actually earns or is capable of earning in any week thereafter" might have
been preferable, to avoid the possibility that a partially disabled person capable of
working would not be rewarded with the maximum possible compensation for refusing
to do so. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977
Term- Workmen's Compensation, 38 LA. L. Ray. 483, 488 (1978). LA. R.S. 23:1221(3)
(Supp. 1968), as it appeared prior to its amendment by 1975 La. Acts, No. 583, con-
tained the phrase "able to earn."
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phrase is not radically different from the former "inability to
do work of any reasonable character" and predict that the sec-
tion is destined to be interpreted just as the former section was
construed. However, there is an obstacle to this interpretation
which was not present in the former provision. In this instance,
the legislature has specifically provided for the case of the
claimant who is prevented by his injury from returning to the
same work; he is to be considered partially disabled. The pre-
vious disability section did not provide for such a case, leaving
it to the judiciary to determine whether such a factual situation
should be deemed to be "inability to do work of any reasonable
character."
The new section requires that the court interpret the
phrase "inability to engage in any gainful occupation for
wages." In some of the early interpretations, it has been held
that a claimant who could return to a gainful occupation, but
could do so only by working in substantial pain, is to be consid-
ered totally disabled.2 There is certainly nothing inconsistent
with the new section in such a conclusion. Nothing in the sec-
tion states that the employee is not disabled if he can engage
in any gainful occupation for wages, whether in pain or not.
And the social policy carried out in the Act is such that we
could not in good conscience conclude that an employee could
be considered as capable of working when he could only do so
in substantial pain. Under the circumstances, it seems fair to
predict that the so-called "working in pain" jurisprudence will
continue to be viable under the new definition. But given that
there is no limit on the number of weeks of benefits which may
be paid under total disability and thus that fairly substantial
amounts are involved, and given that re-opening an award is
possible but rare, considerable care should be exercised by the
judiciary in assessing whether a claimant will in fact be work-
ing in substantial pain if he returns to work.2
21. Wright v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 357 So. 2d 1213 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 360 So. 2d 1180 (La. 1978); Rachal v. Highlands Ins. Co., 355 So. 2d 1355 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 So. 2d 645 (La. 1978), Phillips v. Dresser Eng'r Co.,
351 So. 2d 304 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 1048 (La. 1978).
22. See the doubts expressed by Watson, J., dissenting in part and concurring
in part in Phillips v. Dresser Eng'r Co., 351 So. 2d 304, 310 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 1048 (La. 1978).
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A much more difficult case than the "working in pain"
case is that presented in Ashworth v. Elton Pickering, Inc. 2
The plaintiff suffered a heart injury during his work as a log
cutter;" when he attempted to return to that work, he suffered
recurring symptoms of his previous heart problem and ceased
that employment. He was said to be "illiterate" and without
"other work experience." The primary question for resolution
was whether he was totally or only partially disabled.
There was no dispute that plaintiff had not returned to his
former employment, except for the brief period indicated; the
medical evidence was that he should not do so. But there was
also medical evidence that he would be able to perform certain
light work without pain or harm to his health. As he had no
previous experience at, or any particular education or training
for, any other occupation, the court held that plaintiff was
totally disabled. The majority was of the opinion that one had
to take account of the "realistic earning capacity" of the dis-
abled worker, and could not view the matter from a "solely
medical" perspective.25
The majority reached this conclusion by asserting that the
definition of partial disability was that a person unable to per-
form his usual occupation, but able to perform another for
which he is fitted by education, training or experience, should
be considered partially disabled.26 It would follow, according to
23. 361 So. 2d 940, 945 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 362 So. 2d 1119 (La.
1978)(Watson, J., concurred in the result but would have remanded for taking of
further evidence. Culpepper and Domengeaux, JJ., dissented in part and concurred
in part).
24. There was some dispute on this point in the trial court since the injury was
diagnosed as an aspect of congestive heart failure. But the appellate court found no
reversible error in the trial court's conclusion that an accident and injury had occurred
and was causally connected to plaintiff's disability.
25. The court added: "Conversely, we believe that the legislature intended that
where an employee would become fit for any gainful occupation only by a reasonable
degree of further education, training, or experience, the extreme lack of education,
training or experience would be relevant to our analysis." 361 So. 2d at 944.
26. This is not a completely accurate rephrasing of the statutory language and
may have unwittingly led the majority into a strained interpretation. Section 1211(3)
provides that compensation shall be paid "for injury producing partial disability. ..
to perform the duties in which he was customarily engaged when injured or duties of
the same or similar character, nature, or description for which he was fitted by educa-
tion, training, or experience . "LA. R.S. 23:1221(3) (Supp. 1968), as amended by
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this reasoning, that a claimant such as plaintiff could not be
partially disabled. But the court held that it would be
"illogical" to conclude that he was injured during his employ-
ment and yet not award any compensation. Thus, in the court's
opinion he had to be considered totally disabled because he had
"no reasonable ability to engage in any gainful occupation, in
his physical condition." The claimant's lack of education,
training and experience was mentioned, but the court based its
holding upon his physical condition, despite the medical evi-
dence that certain light work was possible.
Without quarrelling for the moment with the result, it
should be said that the opinion takes unnecessary liberty with
the statutory language. The amended statute is relatively sim-
ple. A worker is totally disabled if he cannot engage in any
gainful occupation for wages. He is partially disabled if he can
engage in a gainful occupation for wages. The addition to each
definition of the language "whether or not" the occupation is
the same as the one he was accustomed to, or is trained for, was
probably only intended to clarify the fact that the former juris-
prudential rules on disability were to be applied exclusively to
partial disability cases. It is ironic that this surplusage could
be used to contradict the apparent legislative intent.
This is not to say that the decision in Ashworth is erro-
neous in its result, but the reasoning should follow a different
line. Since the matter is still open for further delineation, some
thought ought to be given to the proper interpretation of engag-
ing in "any gainful occupation for wages." It seems that the
Ashworth factual situation would be an appropriate one for the
application of the so-called "odd lot" doctrine.
1975 La. Acts, No. 583. A person such as plaintiff, who could not perform the same
duties nor similar ones for which he was trained and educated, should probably be
considered partially disabled, at least until he is able to demonstrate that he falls in
the "odd-lot" category. Unfortunately, the Act contains no provision for rehabilitating
or even re-educating an injured employee so that he can perform another task in the
economy. The majority must have been aware of that fact and, under the circumstan-
ces, granted a total disability award. Such a strained interpretation of section 1221(3)
may someday work an injustice in a case in which an injured employee can return to
some employment though not the same employment, even though not presently
trained for that employment; such a person, barring classification as an "odd-lot"
worker, should probably be termed partially disabled.
27. 361 So. 2d at 944.
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Simply stated, this doctrine is that a claimant may be
considered totally disabled if, after his injury, he is considered
an "odd lot" in the competitive labor market, i.e., that he may
be capable of holding various jobs from time to time, but that
the kind of work he may perform is so limited in quality, de-
pendability or quantity that a reasonably stable market for
that work does not exist.2 The phrase itself may have origi-
nated in an English case in which the writing judge opined that
"if . . the capacities for work left to him fit him only for
special uses, and do not, so to speak, make his powers of labor
a merchantable article in some of the well-known lines of the
labor market" then the claimant "if I might be allowed to use
an undignified phrase" is an "odd lot in the labor market
"29
The concept was borrowed for use in the United States30
and has become a fixture of the jurisprudence in a number of
states, including Florida,3 Oregon, 2 Minnesota,m Nebraska"
28. This oft-cited formulation of the concept was originally stated in Lee v.
Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 230 Minn. 315, 41 N.W.2d 433, 436-37 (1950). The subject is
discussed in some detail in A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §57.50 et seq. (Desk
Ed. 1977). Some of the recent law review commentaries include: Workers' Compensa-
tion-Calculation of Earning Capacity-Mathison v. Thermal Company, 4 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 268 (1978); Buchanan, Evidence in Workmen's Compensation Cases,
54 N. DAK. L. REV. 171 (1977); Note, Vocational Rehabilitation for the Industrially
Injured Worker, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 101 (1975-76); Skelton, Workmen's Compensation
in Oregon: Ten Years After, 12 WILLAMETrE L.J. 1 (1975-76). See generally Malone,
Total Disability Evaluation Under the Louisiana Compensation Act, 20 LA. L. REv.
486, 504-06 (1960).
29. Cardiff Corp. v. Hall, [1911] 1 K.B. 1009.
30. Among the earliest cases is Jordan v. Decorative Co., 230 N.Y. 522, 525, 130
N.E. 634, 635-36 (1921), in which Judge Cardozo phrased it thusly:
He [the plaintiff] was an unskilled or common laborer. He coupled his
request for employment with notice that the labor must be light. The applicant
imposing such conditions is quickly put aside for more versatile competitors.
Business has little patience with the suitor for ease and favor. He is the "odd-
lot" man, . . . the "nondescript in the labor market .... "Work, if he gets it,
is likely to be casual and intermittent . . . . Rebuff, if suffered, might reasona-
bly be ascribed to the narrow opportunities that await the sick and the halt.
31. Abbenante v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 241 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1970); Millender
v. City of Carrabelle, 174 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1965); Reed v. Sherry Frontenac Hotel, 150
So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1963); Port Everglades Terminal Co. v. Canty, 120 So. 2d 596 (Fla.
1960).
32. Swanson v. Westport Lumber Co., 4 Or. App. 417, 479 P.2d 1005 (1971);
Cooper v. Publishers Paper Co., 3 Or. App. 415, 474 P.2d 27 (1970). See Deaton v.
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and a number of others.u In these states, the statutory defini-
tion of total disability is not unlike that recently chosen by the
Louisiana legislature, but the feeling has been that the statu-
tory language could not be taken so literally as to require the
claimant to be "absolutely helpless or physically broken and
wrecked for all purposes except merely to live."3
The "odd lot" doctrine has some fairly well-defined ele-
ments which bear consideration. The burden of proof remains
with the claimant to show the ordinary circumstances of com-
pensability: that there was an injury or occupational disease
arising out of and in the course of employment. 7 But to this
he should add, in an "odd lot" case, that the result is such that
he must be considered in the category of odd-lot workers. To
do so, he should present evidence of the extent of his physical
impairment, his mental capacity, his education, his training,
his age and any other factor which tends to prove that he would
be considered at a substantial disadvantage in competing with
others for any recognized calling in the labor market.3 1 If he
SAIF, 13 Or. App. 298, 509 P.2d 1215 (1973).
33. Castle v. City of Stillwater, 235 Minn. 502, 51 N.W.2d 370 (1952) (police chief
suffering spine injury impairing use of right hand and coordination of arms and causing
"peg-legged" type of walk, 69 years of age with eighth-grade education; did a little
work of a gardening nature for short periods of time; held totally disabled); Lee v.
Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 230 Minn. 315, 41 N.W.2d 433 (1950).
34. Dietz v. State, 157 Neb. 324, 59 N.W.2d 587 (1953) (prison guard struck by
escaped inmate on head with heavy iron resulting in headaches, nervousness, inability
to concentrate, anxiety, tension, tics or twitches, and spasms of muscles with intermit-
tent pain, numbness of extremities, dizziness and convulsions; performed light security
work which only required him to sit and guard personal property; held totally disa-
bled).
35. See the discussion in A. LARSON, supra note 28, at §57.50 et. seq.; National
Fuel Co. v. Arnold, 121 Colo. 220, 214 P.2d 784 (1950); Anderson v. Whitaker, 247
S.W.2d 980 (Ky. 1952).
36. Port Everglades Terminal Co. v. Canty, 120 So.2d 596, 600 (Fla. 1960). The
Florida statute in question defined disability as "incapacity because of the injury to
earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving
at the time of the injury." FLA. STAT. §440.02(9). See also International Minerals &
Chem. Corp. v. Tucker, 55 So. 2d 720, 722 (Fla. 1951).
37. There is no reason for the "odd-lot" doctrine to be regarded as having made
any change in this requirement. The claimant must still show that the incident is
covered under the Act. The question of the extent of his injury and disability is a
separate matter, and it is only to this question that the "odd-lot" doctrine has applica-
tion.
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convinces the court of this fact, he has presented a prima facie
case for classification in the odd-lot category. If the employer
or insurer is to escape a conclusion of total disability, it would
ordinarily be required to present evidence that some form of
suitable work is regularly continuously available to the claim-
ant,39 most probably limited to availability in the general area
of his residence. 0 Such evidence might be adduced by testi-
mony of a vocational employment counselor or other expert in
vocational rehabilitation." It might be adduced, in an appro-
priate case, by testimony that the employer would be willing
to re-hire the employee for designated employment.2
Further refinements are, of course, available. If the em-
ployee's physical condition, age, experience and training are
38. Consider, for example, the kinds of evidence presented in: Abbenante v.
United Parcel Service, Inc., 241 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1970) (40-year-old claimant suffered
from crippling in some limbs after injury, occasional blackouts and amnesia; adjudi-
cated permanently disabled for social security purposes; had been employed by Good-
will Industries but released after four days because he could not do the work); Millen-
der v. City of Carrabelle, 174 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1965) (43-year-old claimant with back
and leg injury; previously employed at heavy labor; fifth-grade education; previous
employer refused re-employment; rehabilitation nurse testified that she was unable to
find employment for him in place of residence); Reed v. Sherry Frontenac Hotel, 150
So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1963) (30-year-old woman suffered amputation of hand; sixth-grade
education; intellience quotient of high-grade moron; work experience limited to work
as maid or laundress; testimony that she could not understand how to operate a power
sewing machine, which had been one possible employment for her); Port Everglades
Terminal Co. v. Canty, 120 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1960) (back injury; ninth-grade education;
previous employment at manual labor; sought employment at numerous places but
was unable to hold any one job for more than a week or two); Swanson v. Westport
Lumber Co., 4 Or. App. 417, 479 P.2d 1005 (1971) (63-year-old; back injury; evidence
proffered to effect that claimant could be employed as security guard, but when wit-
ness was asked hypothetical question detailing claimant's physical impairment, he
answered that he had no openings in his business at the time for such a person).
39. A. LARsoN, supra note 28, at §57.50 and authorities therein cited; Swanson
v. Westport Lumber Co., 4 Or. App. 417, 479 P.2d 1005 (1971).
40. See Millender v. City of Carrabelle, 174 So. 2d 740, 742 (Fla. 1965). This
seems particularly important. It is obviously of no great value, even given the theory
of mobility of labor, to say to an injured claimant in Louisiana that a job which he
could perform is available in Phoenix, Arizona. There is no indication that the legisla-
ture intended transplantation of employees as a solution to the Louisiana employment
accident problem.
41. See Abbenante v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 241 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1970).
42. It is obvious that this may be a delicate matter. An employer who vigorously
asserts that the claimant can perform designated tasks available in the economy is very
likely to be asked whether he himself has a job for the claimant.
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not such that one would be inclined to conclude that he was
an "odd lot" in the labor market, it might be appropriate to
require evidence as to his desire to work and motivation to gain
full-time employment. In other words, one needs to be con-
vinced that he has in fact tried unsucessfully to obtain employ-
ment. When his condition and the other factors are such that
one can reasonably conclude that there is no steady employ-
ment for him in the market, evidence of motivation is perhaps
unnecessary.43
It may be observed that Louisiana has not previously rec-
ognized such a doctrine. It has not previously had any need of
it. The judicial interpretation of the former definition of disa-
bility was such that a person was in effect classified as an "odd
lot" in the labor market if he could not return to the same job;
evidence of other available employment was simply not rele-
vant to the question. Injured claimants thus had an interpreta-
tion much preferable to the "odd lot" doctrine.
It is not a coincidence that the persons most likely to fall
in an "odd lot" category are the persons most in need of the
benefits available under compensation, i.e., persons of little
education and limited training and experience, perhaps ad-
vanced in age, as to whom there is no evidence that their skills
are regularly usable in the labor market. The plaintiff in
Ashworth might arguably fall in this category, though consider-
ation should be given to the medical evidence that he could do
some light work. This should be supplemented by evidence of
the actual availability of such work in the vicinity.
It may be argued, particularly by those on the defense side,
that this concept is not specifically authorized by the amended
section and seems to run counter to its tenor. This hardly seems
to be a pragmatic position. In the first place, the statute re-
quires that a person be able "to engage in any gainful occupa-
tion for wages" in order to be excluded from the total disability
provision. The legislature could have chosen a phrase such as
"unable to obtain employment" or "unable to hold a job," but
did not do so. It is not implausible to argue that "engaging" in
a gainful occupation conveys the meaning of fairly steady,
43. Deaton v. SAIF, 13 Or. App. 298, 509 P.2d 1215 (1973).
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available employment, not a series of pick-up jobs where the
employee may be the last hired and the first fired.
In the second place, an argument that the section should
be interpreted literally eventually ends in the conclusion that
only the absolutely helpless and broken claimant, completely
incapable of holding a job of any nature for even the shortest
period of time, is entitled to a total disability award." Anyone
who believes that this conclusion will be judicially accepted
ignores the lesson of the last thirty years of decisions under the
former disability provisions.
Finally, acceptance of a doctrine at least similar to the
"odd lot" theory allows considerable flexibility on both sides to
determine fairly whether the injured employee has the prospect
of steady employment in the labor market. If he does, then
society should not be burdened with a permanent disability
award in his favor. If he does not, he should not be placed by
society in a deprived state on the basis of a very literal interpre-
tation of the Act.
A word of caution is in order. To a great extent, the 1975
amendments alter the character of the Act. While certainly no
one covered by its provisions will become a millionaire, the
removal of the maximum number of weeks of payments and the
tying of the maximum amount to the average weekly wage
mean that substantial amounts of money are involved. In light
of that, an award based on the "odd lot" doctrine should not
be cavalierly made. Plaintiff should be made to demonstrate,
with appropriate evidence, that he falls in that category; defen-
dant should be made to demonstrate that such is not the case,
based on evidence of the availability of employment to a person
of plaintiff's impaired capabilities. The "odd lot" doctrine per-
mits this determination to be made.
COVERAGE OF THE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR ENGAGED IN
"MANUAL LABOR"
In Lushute v. Diesi,4" the supreme court undertook to de-
44. This seems a particularly heartless position when one recalls that the Loui-
siana Act makes absolutely no provision for rehabilitation of an injured worker.
45. 354 So. 2d 179 (La. 1978).
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fine the limits of coverage for independent contractors engaged
in manual labor in carrying out their contracts, and in doing
so may have subjected the Act to a doubtful interpretation
which could lead to unjust results. Lushute was a self-
employed plumber, electrician and general handyman who
over a period of thirty years had repaired various sorts of me-
chanical equipment at defendant's restaurant. He was said to
have a number of clients, perhaps 250, and was paid by the
hour for the work that he performed. He was called to defen-
dant's restaurant about once or twice a month and was engaged
in repairing an air conditioning unit there when he fell through
the ceiling and died of injuries suffered in the fall. The trial
court awarded compensation against both the individual de-
fendant and the corporation (restaurant), and the appellate
court affirmed as to the corporation."
The supreme court held that Lushute was an independent
contractor engaged in manual labor at the time of his death,
but denied compensation on the basis that the work he was
performing was not "an integral part of his principal's trade,
business or occupation."' 7 This is a somewhat startling conclu-
sion, given that the only portion of the Act in which coverage
is extended to independent contractors makes no such require-
ment. That portion-Revised Statutes 23:1021(6)-simply
states:
"Independent contractor" means any person who ren-
ders service, other than manual labor, for a specified re-
compense for a specified result either as a unit or as a
whole, under the control of his principal as to results of his
work only, and not as to the means by which such result
is accomplished, and are expressly excluded from ...
this chapter unless a substantial part of the work time of
an independent contractor is spent in manual labor by
him carrying out the terms of the contract, in which case
the independent contractor is expressly covered by ...
this Chapter.
46. Lushute v. Diesi, 343 So. 2d 1132 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
47. 354 So. 2d at 183. The appellate court had, in its decision, raised this issue
but had concluded that air conditioning repair, in the case of a restaurant in the South
in the 1970's, was an integral part of the restaurant business.
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In reaching its conclusion, the majority referred first to the
provisions of the original act, 8 now found in section 1061,
which specified that the employees of a "contractor" could seek
compensation from the person ("the principal") with whom
their employer had contracted, if the work being executed was
a part of the principal's trade, business or occupation. Then the
court noted a 1926 amendment which made no substantial
change in that section but added a new section specifying that
''a person rendering service for another . . .(other than as an
independent contractor, which is expressly excluded hereun-
der) is presumed to be an employee . . . .,,4 The same statute
then defined "independent contractor" as section 1021(6) does
now. Finally, the majority noted the 1948 amendment which
specifically extended coverage to certain independent contrac-
tors engaged in manual labor.5 From this review, the majority
concluded that the legislature meant to define independent
contractor by combining the definition it had given in 1926 and
the one given in another portion of the Act in 1914 to
"contractor." This led to the holding that only an independent
contractor otherwise qualified under the Act who performed
work which was a part of the trade, business or occupation of
the principal was covered under the Act.
It is believed that the majority's understanding of the his-
tory of these amendments is faulty. The original act was made
applicable to certain employees and contained no definition of,
or even reference to, an independent contractor. No doubt it
was thought that no definition was needed. This proved to be
wishful thinking. The supreme court was almost immediately
faced with making a distinction and made several false starts5
before settling into a somewhat vaguely defined "control" test,
tempered with an inquiry into the "grade and status" of the
injured claimant.52
48. 1914 La. Acts, No. 20.
49. 1926 La. Acts, No. 85, §3(8).
50. 1948 La. Acts, No. 179.
51. Helton v. Tall Timber Co., 148 La. 180, 86 So. 729 (1920); Ryland v. Harve
M. Wheeler Lumber Co., 146 La. 787, 84 So. 55 (1919); Clark v. Tall Timber Lumber
Co., 140 La. 380, 73 So. 239 (1916).
52. Dick v. Gravel Logging Co., Inc., 152 La. 993,95 So. 99 (1922); Bell v. Hanson
Lumber Co., 151 La. 824, 92 So. 350 (1922).
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The 1926 amendment, as we have seen, largely codified the
jurisprudential rule in force at that time. This amendment,
while potentially an improvement because it excluded from
coverage an independent contractor (as defined) who rendered
service "other than manual labor," turned out to be trouble-
some.
The principal difficulty was the reference to "service other
than manual labor." Was it intended that a person who was by
every other indicia an independent contractor, but was en-
gaged in manual labor, would on that account become an em-
ployee entitled to compensation? The jurisprudence wrestled
with that question for years,53 eventually reaching a fitful, neg-
ative answer in Allgood v. Loeb. 4
Subsequent to the Allgood decision, and very likely in an
attempt to overrule it legislatively,55 the 1948 Act amended the
definition, which appears without change today as section
1021(6). This amendment, as we have seen, does not create an
employment relationship. It simply entitles a qualified con-
tractor to an employee's benefits under the Act, under the same
conditions. Those conditions are contained in section 1035:
that the individual be injured while performing services arising
out of and incidental to his employment in the course of his
53. Hatten v. Haynes, 175 La. 743, 144 So. 483 (1932); Clements v. Luby Oil Co.,
170 La. 910, 129 So. 526 (1930) (fact of manual labor is only one consideration in
determining whether status is that of employee or independent contractor); Rodgers
v. City of Hammond, 178 So. 732 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938); Harris v. Louisiana Oil
Refining Corp., 137 So. 598 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931); Myers v. Newport Co., 135 So.
767 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1931); Cobb v. Long Bell Lumber Co., 134 So. 310 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1931).
54. 210 La. 594, 27 So. 2d 380 (1946). It is interesting to note that Allgood was
actually a tort case, brought by an injured individual who was met by the defense that
since he engaged in manual labor in carrying out a contract with the defendant, he
was covered by the Act and his remedy was exclusively in workmen's compensation.
The court's opinion rejected that argument, and in doing so announced the principle
that the fact that "the contract contemplates the performance of manual labor, and
the fact that the plaintiff actually engaged in manual labor in carrying out the con-
tract, would not transform the plaintiff into an employee if his status in all other
respects was that of an independent contractor." Id. at 604, 27 So. 2d at 383. It is not
unlikely that the legislative overruling of Allgood was actually more an effort to curb
tort actions than it was to extend compensation to certain independent contractors.
55. Taylor v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 220 La. 995, 58 So. 2d 206 (1952);
Manuel v. Jennings Lumber Co., 248 So. 2d 908 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
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employer's trade, business or occupation." There is no statu-
tory requirement that those services be "a part" of the em-
ployer's business.5 7
In choosing the compensation scheme and protecting the
compromise underlying it, the legislature initially attempted to
assure that persons who were not employees should not receive
compensation for work-related injuries. One device to assure
that result was to exclude "independent contrators" from the
Act. The obvious difficulty with such a distinction was that it
very often was hard to determine whether an injured individual
was an employee or an independent contractor. A closely allied
problem was the invitation such a distinction offered to dis-
guise employees as independent contractors so as to avoid lia-
bility under the Act. Such efforts were in fact made, and they
led to the 1948 amendment which attempted to remedy that
problem. Its focus on "manual labor" was an effective, if some-
what blunt, solution to this recurring problem. By choosing this
solution, Louisiana chose to base the decision about whether to
grant compensation coverage not on the distinction between an
employee and an independent contractor, with its knotty
"right to control" problem, but rather upon whether the in-
jured individual was engaged in manual labor, even if he might
56. "The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to every person performing
services arising out of and incidental to his employment in the course of his employer's
trade, business or occupation .... " LA. R.S. 23:1035 (Supp. 1975 & 1976).
57. In fact, it is clear that the genuine employee is entitled to a more liberal test
on the question of coverage as to his employer than is the employee of a contractor
with reference to the principal. The former need merely show that his services when
injured arose out of and were "incidental to his employment in the course of" the
employer's business, while the latter must show that the work he was engaged in was
"a part" of the principal's business. To demonstrate the difference, one might consider
Ludlow v. American Bank & Trust Co., 339 So. 2d 478 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976). Ludlow
was a service station operator who reconditioned repossessed automobiles for the de-
fendant in order to enhance their resale value. In the event that one of Ludlow's
employees had been injured during such work, compensation would be awarded
against the bank only if it were shown that automobile repairing were a part of the
bank's trade, business or occupation-a doubtful conclusion. If the same test applied
to Ludlow himself, compensation would also probably be denied. But, as the Ludlow
decision noted, the working independent contractor need only show that he was injured
in the course of the bank's trade, business or occupation, the more liberal test applica-
ble to the bank's own employees. It may be that some would prefer a different resolu-
tion of this situation, but it is hard to deny that the Act does make this distinction.
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technically be classified as an independent contractor.
At this time, this seemed a direct manner of solving most
of the problems. It is, however, a treatment only of the symp-
tom and not the disease. Those who appear not to be employees
and yet spend a substantial amount of their time in manual
labor carrying out a contract very often are not in a financial
position to hire someone else to do that job. They either do not
have the expertise, or in some cases the motivation, to manage
the work of others with its attendant responsibilities and costs.
Yet in performing the manual labor themselves, they do not
have the bargaining power to pass on the costs of their own
injuries to the person with whom they have contracted.
In fine, such persons simply are not running a business
organization separate and independent from that of the person
with whom they have contracted. They thus lack one of the
essential elements of any efficient compensation system: a de-
vice to spread the risk of injury and dilute the costs of those
risks in that fashion.58
Treating the disease rather than the symptom, a few juris-
dictions have begun to resolve the question of compensation
coverage by asking whether the injured individual (who ap-
pears to be an independent contractor and arguably is not cov-
ered) is in fact running an enterprise separate from that run by
his principal. If he is, then certainly it is fair to ask that enter-
prise rather than the principal's enterprise to bear the cost of
injury to such an individual. If he is not, it is probably unfair
to place upon him the cost of injury which the compensation
system was intended to place upon someone else.
The Louisiana Act does not contain any specific reference
to such a distinction, and perhaps some legislative modifica-
tion would be desirable. But when one examines the traditional
tests employed to distinguish the independent contractor from
the employee, it becomes apparent that these criteria are in
fact indicia of the presence or absence of an independent busi-
ness enterprise. Some of the criteria often given are services on
a lump sum basis, control of method of doing the work, effect
of employing helpers, effect of supplying equipment, and the
58. See W. MALONE, M. PLANr & J. Lrrri, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION 51 (1974).
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specialized nature of the work." There are recent indications
that the court should look more to the claimant's
"independence in business" or lack of it to assist in answering
the question of coverage.' 0
The "independent business" approach to distinguishing
among compensation claims by supposed independent contrac-
tors will not always be an easy standard to apply. One impor-
tant element suggested by a noted authority is the degree of
independence enjoyed by the individual in relation to a partic-
ular employer." If the worker does not advertise to the public
an independent business enterprise, and in fact does most of
the work for a particular employer, albeit under a "contract,"
he may very well be treated as an employee for compensation
purposes. 2 An additional important element in detecting the
presence of an independent enterprise is whether the work
being performed by the independent contractor is a part of the
alleged employer's business.'
It is likely that these two elements-recurring, almost ex-
clusive, service to one employer and work which is a part of the
employer's business-will coincide in most cases in which ei-
ther is present. This simply reflects the facts of business. A task
59. See, e.g., Durant v. Industrial Lumber Co., 6 So. 2d 164 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1942).
60. Sones v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 272 So. 2d 739 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 273 So. 2d 292 (La. 1973). See also Davis v. Home Ins. Co., 291 So. 2d 455 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1974).
61. A. LARSON, supra note 28, at § 45.31.
62. Consider the decision in Vizena v. Travelers, 238 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 256 La. 885, 239 So. 2d 542 (1970). The deceased welder
"maintained his own welding shop" and owned his own equipment. He was said to be
"not employed fulltime by anyone," but instead accepted various welding jobs at a
fixed amount per hour. The testimony indicated, however, that he was engaged by the
defendant to do welding "at the latter's plant on an average of 12 or 13 times per year."
The battleground in the case was whether the deceased spent a substantial part of the
work time in manual labor; there was considerable discussion about his, being a
"skilled craftsman" who did not engage in manual labor. This was argued, it is true,
by the plaintiffs in the context of seeking a tort instead of a workmen's compensation
recovery. But the issue could just as easily have been resolved in the same way by
focusing on whether his was an independent business enterprise, rather than whether
he was a "skilled craftsman" or not.
63. A. LARSON, supra note 28, at § 45.20. See Evans v. Naihaus, 326 So. 2d 601
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
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which recurs frequently and without which a business could not
function efficiently" is probably one which is more economi-
cally performed by employees or employee-like persons. But if
compensation costs could be shifted onto those who perform
the work, then it would be more economical to contract the
work to others. It is precisely this type of shifting which pro-
duced the present problem and has probably produced the
present solution in some jurisdictions of looking to the issue of
"independent business enterprise."
Seen in this light, the majority's concern in Lushute about
whether the deceased's work was "a part" of the restaurant's
business is in fact one of a number of elements properly consid-
ered to determine whether he was engaged in an independent
business enterprise and thus excluded from coverage. Making
this one element an absolute requisite, however, is to miss the
primary objective underlying this section of the Act. An indi-
vidual not engaged in an independent enterprise, yet not doing
work which may be considered "a part" of the business as
opposed to being "incidental" to the business, will be denied
compensation under this decision while an employee would be
granted compensation."5 This is contrary to the letter and the
spirit of the Act; once the court concluded that Lushute was
an independent contractor and was engaged in manual labor
in carrying out the contract, then he should have been accorded
an employee's rights under the Act.
None of this is to say that the result in Lushute is incor-
rect. There is ample evidence to support the conclusion that
Lushute was engaged in an independent business enterprise of
his own. He had 250 clients; he had been in business for himself
for a number of years; he only called upon this particular defen-
dant once or twice a month. It would have been helpful to know
whether he advertised as a separate business entity and per-
64. Maintenance and minor repair tasks are probably the most common such
tasks. Perhaps the air conditioning repair under consideration in Lushute was such a
task. Of course, if the evidence showed that the restaurant were a small operation
which chose to have its air conditioning serviced by independent operators in that
business rather than by its own employees, a proper conclusion of exclusion of coverage
could be reached even though the task might "more efficiently" have been accom-
plished by employees.
65. See note 57, supra.
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haps to know the amount of income derived from this client as
a percentage of his total income. It may well have been that
his was an independent business enterprise which could appro-
priately be made to bear the cost of work-related injury.
But the reasoning process of grafting onto the section spe-
cifically granting coverage for certain independent contractors
the language of another section with an entirely different pur-
pose (section 1061, reaching the evil of avoidance of compensa-
tion responsibility by principals by making them responsible to
the employees of a contractor if "a part" of the principal's
business is being carried out by that contractor) should not be
approved. These are two different problems, dealt with by the
Act in differing ways, and should likewise be separated in their
jurisprudential treatment.
The writer does not overlook the fact that in the days of
minimal benefits, an "independent contractor" would more
often seek to be excluded from coverage than to be included,
in order to be permitted to proceed in tort. Whether the court
had this in mind in its restrictive definition of a covered inde-
pendent contractor, and whether the same view should prevail
now that benefits have been increased and are unlimited in
duration, is merely speculation. But such a restrictive defini-
tion seems of little solace to the claimant or his survivors when
no viable tort suit is in the offing. Limited benefits for work-
related injuries even when no tort suit is available was, after
all, one of the objectives of the compensation system.

